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DELEGATION AS A DANGER TO LIBERTY
Nadine Strossen*
I am delighted to participate in this important symposium. I
am not an expert on the regulatory process or administrative law.
Rather, my expertise and concerns are in the area of individual
freedom. Accordingly, my interest in the delegation issue is
rooted in my commitment to liberty.
In significant respects, liberty is threatened when the law-
making function of government is delegated to unelected, unac-
countable bureaucrats. In his pivotal opinion in the landmark case
of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics,' Justice John Marshall Harlan reminded us that mem-
bers of Congress, along with state legislatures, are "ultimate
guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as
great a degree as the courts."2 Justice Harlan's statement prompts
this question: What exactly is Congress's essential constitutional
role as a guardian of liberty? And this question, in turn, triggers
another: What is the relevant concept of liberty?
For the Framers of the Constitution, liberty was essentially
the right to be left alone by government unless some important
public purpose warranted intervention.' The modern Supreme
Court has embodied this concept in the so-called heightened scru-
tiny standards of judicial review.'
To protect liberty, thus understood, the Framers adopted sev-
eral complementary strategies. Of these strategies, modern case
law has most frequently addressed the judicially enforceable rights
* Professor of Law, New York Law School; President, American Civil Liberties Un-
ion. For research and administrative assistance in preparing this piece, Professor Strossen
thanks her academic assistant, Amy L. Tenney, and her research assistants, Ili Graeler,
Jenean M. Klein, and Mark A. Konkel. She also gratefully acknowledges the inspiration
and insights of her NYLS colleague, Professor David Schoenbrod.
1 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
2 Id. at 407 (quoting Missouri, Kan., & Tex. Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267,270 (1904)).
3 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("The makers of our Constitution ... conferred, as against the Government, the right to
be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men."), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
4 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES § 6.5, at 414-17 (1997) (describing the history of, and the reasoning behind, lev-
els of scrutiny in constitutional review).
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that are expressly articulated, notably, those found in the Bill of
Rights. These constitutionally enumerated rights prohibit speci-
fied types of government actions, such as censoring speech or pre-
venting the free exercise of religion.'
Important as they are, explicit constitutional rights are not co-
terminous with the Framers' appropriately broad concept of lib-
erty.6 Rather, from the broad array of possible government actions
that undermine liberty, these express rights carve out a few such
actions that are barred, or at least subject to close judicial scrutiny.
These rights generally concern those government actions that are
particularly likely to lack an important public purpose or to pres-
ent a peculiarly grave threat to individual freedom. But these ex-
plicit constitutional rights do not protect us from many other
threats to our liberty-our right to be let alone absent the need to
promote an important public purpose.7 In short, these judicially
enforceable, express constitutional rights do not, in many circum-
stances, stop government from imposing regulations or taxes for
what are actually private purposes.
Because explicit constitutional rights fall short of fully guaran-
teeing the Framers' conception of liberty, we must look elsewhere
for further protection. One possible source of such further protec-
tion is contained within the legislative process defined in Article
I-a second essential strategy that the Framers designed to protect
liberty. This complementary strategy actually preceded the devel-
opment of enumerated judicially enforceable rights.8 In fact, Al-
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6 See Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2109 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring):
In recent years, perhaps, we have come to think of liberty as defined by that
word in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and as illuminated by the other
provisions of the Bill of Rights. The conception of liberty embraced by the
Framers was not so confined. They used the principles of separation of powers
and federalism to secure liberty in the fundamental political sense of the term,
quite in addition to the idea of freedom from intrusive governmental acts.
7 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the constitution of certain rights
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."); see also
Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 15 (1988).
8 See Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2103 (noting that "[t]he procedures governing the enact-
ment of statutes set forth in the text of Article I were the product of the great debates and
compromises that produced the Constitution itself," and striking down the Line Item Veto
Act for violating those procedures); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) ("It emerges
clearly that the prescription for legislative action in [Article I], represents the Framers'
decision that the legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with
a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure."); DAVID SCHOENBROD,
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH
DELEGATION 29 (1993) (stating that the Constitution's "baroque" legislative process, set
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exander Hamilton opposed adding a bill of rights to the Constitu-
tion on the ground that "the constitution is itself in every rational
sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS." 9
Hamilton was wrong in concluding that the Constitution, in-
cluding the Article I legislative process, makes a bill of rights su-
perfluous, as his contemporaries fortunately perceived and history
has proved. But Hamilton was correct in concluding that the leg-
islative process significantly helps to protect liberty.
Delegation of this constitutionally defined lawmaking power
to regulatory agencies undercuts its important protection of liberty
in four ways. First, delegation shifts power from Congress and the
President-two highly visible institutions that are responsive to a
broad spectrum of interests-to various agencies, commissions,
and boards-lower-visibility institutions that are attuned to only a
small subset of all the interests. According to the political science
literature, agencies are dominated by their top officials, a small
group of persons from the private sector, and a few key members
of Congress. 10 As John Hart Ely observed, "one reason we have
broadly based representative assemblies is to await something ap-
proaching a consensus before government intervenes."" But no
such consensus is needed when legislative power is delegated.
Second, delegation allows legislators and the President to shift
much of the blame for unpopular government policies to the agen-
cies. Therefore, an important deterrent to enacting unpopular
laws does not deter unpopular regulations.2
Third, delegation makes it far easier to impose new laws. In
James Madison's words, Article I was meant to curb the "facility
and excess of law-making" by requiring that statutes go through a
bicameral legislature and the President. 3 Madison's view that the
legislative process would tend to discourage narrowly partisan
laws-though not eliminate them-has been borne out by much
out in Article I of the Constitution, safeguards liberty); see also John F. Manning, Textual-
ism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 708 (1997) (concluding that the
checks and balances included in Article I were "key element[s] of the constitutional
scheme to preserve individual liberty").
9 THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 515 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
see also Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2109 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("So convinced were the
Framers that liberty of the person inheres in structure that at first they did not consider a
Bill of Rights necessary.").
10 See LAWRENCE C. DODD & RICHARD L. SCHOTT, CONGRESS AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 308-09 (1979).
11 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 134 (1980).
12 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 8, at 9.
13 THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 9, at 378 (James Madison).
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recent political science literature. 4 The differing constituencies of
representatives, senators, and the President-and the differing
lengths of their terms in office-make it likely that they will be
partial to varying interests. This diversity of viewpoint, coupled
with the greater difficulty of prevailing in three forums rather than
one, means that popular support sufficient to produce a bare ma-
jority in a unicameral legislature would probably fail to get a stat-
ute through the Article I process. 5
The fourth respect in which delegation threatens liberty is
consolidation of lawmaking and law enforcement power in the
same hands. 6
I do not mean to suggest that agencies can make whatever
laws they want, whenever they want. The constraints on agency
lawmaking that do exist, however, do not adequately protect indi-
vidual liberty. First, agencies must comply with the Administrative
Procedure Act.17 As the name suggests, though, those require-
ments are simply procedural in nature. They merely slow down
agency lawmaking and do not necessarily weed out laws that vio-
late liberty or lack an important public purpose.
Second, persons affected by agency-made law do have a right
to seek judicial review. But such review is usually highly deferen-
tial. s Agencies have learned to shield even narrowly partisan
regulations from judicial reversal by presenting them as the prod-
uct of reasoned analysis aimed at promoting a public purpose. 9
14 See, e.g., SCHOENBROD, supra note 8, at 29.
15 See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) ("The choices we discern as having
been made in the Constitutional Convention impose burdens on governmental processes
that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable, but those hard choices were con-
sciously made by men who had lived under a form of government that permitted arbitrary
governmental acts to go unchecked.").
16 See WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE:
PROBLEMS AND CASES 22 (1997) (referring to administrative agencies as a "headless
Fourth Branch of government" because of their ability to exercise legislative, executive,
and judicial functions even though the three traditional branches of government are pro-
hibited from doing so by the Constitution).
17 Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 381 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
18 See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (hold-
ing that, unless an agency decision is foreclosed by law, it should be upheld by a reviewing
court as long as it is a "permissible construction of the statute"); Universal Camera Corp.
v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (holding that a court may overturn an agency decision
only if the court cannot "conscientiously find that the evidence supporting the decision is
substantial" in reviewing the entire record); FUNK ET AL., supra note 16, at 269 (compar-
ing the highly deferential standard in judicial review of agency decisions to an appellate
court's very deferential review of a trial court's findings of fact).
19 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 8, at 114.
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Even if the reviewing court finds some flaw in the agency's analy-
sis, the agency remains free to reach the same result backed by a
new explanation that is crafted to overcome the court's prior criti-
cism. 20 In the words of University of Texas law professor Harold
Bruff:
An agency desiring a particular policy outcome can [survive ju-
dicial review through] the charade of hearing from everyone in-
terested, responding to their views and data in rational dis-
course, and elaborating a rationale for the decision that is
coherent, supported by the administrative record, and consis-
tent with prior agency policy and known statutory intent.2'
My point is not that administrative procedure and judicial re-
view of agency action are worthless in protecting liberty. Rather,
my point is that the legislative process is more effective than the
administrative process in doing so. The United States Supreme
Court apparently agrees. Consider, for example, its 1958 ruling in
Kent v. Dulles.22 In Kent, the Court chose to construe narrowly a
statute that gave the Secretary of State discretion to issue or deny
passports. Specifically, the Court held that the statute did not
authorize the Secretary's regulations denying passports to people
affiliated with the Communist Party.23 The Court's opinion, writ-
ten by the great civil libertarian, Justice William 0. Douglas, well
describes delegation's adverse impact on liberty. He wrote:
[T]he right of exit is a personal right included within the word
"liberty" as used in the Fifth Amendment. If that "liberty" is to
be regulated, it must be pursuant to the law-making functions of
the Congress.... Where activities or enjoyment, natural and
often necessary to the well-being of an American citizen, such
as travel, are involved, we will construe narrowly all delegated
powers that curtail or dilute them. We hesitate to find in this
broad generalized power an authority to trench so heavily on
the rights of the citizen.24
The cornerstone of the Court's conclusion was that the legisla-
tive process offers a protection for liberty for which the adminis-
trative process is not an adequate substitute. Unfortunately, de-
spite Kent's broad wording, later Supreme Court decisions have
not so strictly limited delegated lawmaking, even when it en-
20 See id. at 115.
21 Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEx. L. REV.
207, 239 (1984).
22 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
23 See id. at 130.
24 Id. at 129 (citations omitted).
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trenches upon First Amendment rights.
I would now like to move from the abstract to the concrete, to
describe three specific examples of the many actual situations
where delegation has in fact undermined liberty, in particular, the
precious freedom of speech that many consider an especially im-
portant aspect of liberty.
25
The first example centers around the infamous gag rule issued
by the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") in
1988.26 It prohibited employees of federally-funded family plan-
ning clinics from giving any information to their patients about
abortion, even when the patients asked about it,27 and even when
abortion was medically indicated-in other words, even when the
woman's health would be undermined by carrying the pregnancy
to term.28 At that time, HHS could never have garnered the ma-
jorities in the House and the Senate that would have been needed
to enact such a bar in statutory form.29 Undeterred, the HSS made
the law itself.30 The ACLU challenged the gag rule all the way up
25 See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 169 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring)
("[The Court] recognizes implicitly that these First Amendment rights, by reason of the
strict command in that Amendment-a command that carries over to the States by reason
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-are preferred rights."); Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (Cardozo, J.) (stating that freedom of speech "is
the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom").
26 See Prohibition on Counseling and Referral for Abortion Services; Limitation of
Program Services to Family Planning, 42 C.F.R. § 59.8 (1989) (effectiveness suspended
Feb. 5, 1993).
27 See id. § 59.8(b)(5) (mandating that the project counselor tell pregnant women
seeking information about abortions that "the project does not consider abortion an ap-
propriate method of family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer for abor-
tion").
28 See id. § 59.8(a)(2) ("In cases in which emergency care is required, however, the title
X project shall be required only to refer the client immediately to an appropriate provider
of emergency medical services.").
29 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 8, at 16 (explaining that in 1989, when HHS promul-
gated the gag rule, the House and Senate had pro-choice and Democratic majorities).
30 Indeed, several judges concluded that the rule was unlawful on this basis, for ex-
ceeding or contravening the scope of the legislative authority. Justice Blackmun, for ex-
ample, found that "the Secretary's regulation of referral, advocacy, and counseling activi-
ties exceed[ed] his statutory authority." Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 204 (1991)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Further, Justice Stevens stated:
Not a word in the statute ... authorizes the Secretary to impose any restrictions
on the dissemination of truthful information or professional advice by grant re-
cipients .... [The] entirely new approach adopted by the Secretary in 1988 was
not, in my view, authorized by the statute. The new regulations did not merely
reflect a change in a policy determination that the Secretary had been author-
ized by Congress to make. Rather, they represented an assumption of policy-
making responsibility that Congress had not delegated to the Secretary.
Id. at 221-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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to the Supreme Court, where it lost, five to four. A narrow major-
ity of the Justices held that the gag rule did not violate any consti-
tutional rights, neither the explicit right of free speech,31 nor the
implicit right of reproductive freedom.32
Moreover, departing from Kent v. Dulles,33 the Court also
stretched to find statutory authorization for HHS's regulatory ban
on abortion information. The statute in question barred federally-
funded family planning clinics from performing abortions.34 It cer-
tainly did not expressly authorize a ban on information about
abortion. The Court reasoned, nevertheless, that the statute also
did not expressly bar such a ban.35 As Justice Stevens noted in his
dissent, "[i]n a society that abhors censorship and in which policy-
makers have traditionally placed the highest value on the freedom
to communicate, it is unrealistic to conclude that statutory author-
ity to regulate conduct implicitly authorized the Executive to
regulate speech."36
Thanks to the majority's opinion, those who opposed the ban
on abortion information as violating free speech and reproductive
freedom, not to mention on important public health policy
grounds, could only protect these vital rights and interests by en-
acting a statute.37 Large bipartisan majorities in both houses did
support a statutory repeal of the gag rule, but not the two-thirds
supermajorities needed to override President Bush's veto. The
override failed by twelve votes.38  In this situation, accordingly,
delegation created a cruel irony: the hurdles that had been built
into the legislative process to protect liberty instead obstructed its
protection.
For a second specific example of delegation's anti-liberty im-
pact, consider the regulations designed to curb smoking that were
proposed by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") in
31 See id. at 192-200.
32 See id. at 201-02.
33 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
34 See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1994) ("None of the funds appropriated under this title shall
be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning.").
35 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 184 ("Based on the broad directives provided by Congress in
Title X in general and § 1008 in particular, we are unable to say that the Secretary's con-
struction of the prohibition in § 1008 to require a ban on counseling, referral, and advo-
cacy within the Title X project is impermissible.").
36 Id. at 222.
37 See He Defies the Majority on the Gag Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1991, at A30; The
Gag Rule, Gagged, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1991, at A22 (stating that the gag rule denied
"quality family planning services" to clinic patients-most of whom are poor); Thumbing
His Nose at Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1991, at A30.
38 See sources cited supra note 37.
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1995.39 These regulations included restraints on tobacco advertis-
ing in the print media and on billboards,40 raising very serious First
Amendment problems."n
Congress has not outlawed such advertising. Rather, the
FDA claimed authority to enact the regulation under a broadly
worded delegation. 2 The FDA said that it would withdraw the
proposed regulation only if Congress were to enact a similar stat-
ute.43 Therefore, even if both houses of Congress passed a bill bar-
39 See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco Products to Protect Children and Adolescents, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,348 (1995)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, and 897) (proposed Aug. 11, 1995), pub-
lished as final rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1996) [hereinafter Proposed Tobacco Regula-
tions]:
In the case of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco, the primary mode of action is
that of a drug, due to the nicotine, and, therefore, primary jurisdiction over these
products belongs in [the FDA].... It is within FDA's discretionary power to de-
termine which, if any, of the available regulatory authorities it will employ in the
regulation of a product.
But see Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 170 (4th Cir. 1998)
(concluding that the FDA "did not have jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products"), peti-
tion for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan 19, 1999) (No. 98-1152).
40 See Proposed Tobacco Regulations, supra note 39, at 41,374 (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. subpt. D, §§ 897.30, 897.32, 897.34).
41 See Tobacco Legislation: Is It Constitutional?: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Solange E. Bitol, Legislative Counsel,
ACLU) (arguing that the FDA's proposed regulations are unconstitutional because broad
restrictions on billboard, internet, and other advertising are not narrowly tailored enough
to justify curtailing First Amendment rights); Id. (statement of Burt Neuborne, Professor
of Law, New York University School of Law) (finding that the FDA's proposals to restrict
tobacco advertising are "simply far too broad" and would be found unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court); see also Barbara Dority, The Rights of Joe Camel and the Marlboro Man;
Cigarette Advertising Restrictions, HUMANIST, Jan. 11, 1997, at 34 (quoting Northwestern
University law professor and First Amendment expert Martin Redish as stating that
"[t]here are serious constitutional problems with the majority of the new [tobacco] regula-
tions").
42 See 21 U.S.C. § 353(g)(1) (1994) ("The Secretary shall designate a component of the
Food and Drug Administration to regulate products that constitute a combination of a
drug, device, or biological product."); id. § 321(h)(3) (giving the FDA jurisdiction to
regulate any "devices" "intended to affect the structure or any function of the body");
FDA, Executive Summary: Annex: Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Is a
Drug and These Products Are Nicotine Delivery Devices Under the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act: Jurisdictional Determination (visited Nov. 23, 1998)
<http://www.fda.gov/opacom/campaigns/tobacco/execsum.html> (concluding that ciga-
rettes and smokeless tobacco products are drugs and devices under the FDA's jurisdic-
tion). But see Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 153 F.3d at 170; Rep. Ed Whitfield,
FDA Has No Authority to Regulate Tobacco, ROLL CALL, June 10, 1996, at 8 (stating that
the FDA conceded in 1963 that it could not regulate tobacco because doing so would ex-
ceed its statutory grant of authority).
43 See FDA Control Called Illegal, CHATTANOOGA FREE PRESS, Aug. 11, 1995, at Al
(reporting that President Clinton suggested that Congress should come up with compro-
mise legislation in lieu of the FDA regulations).
A DANGER TO LIBERTY
ring FDA regulation of tobacco advertising, the presidential veto
that would likely follow" and the probable lack of congressional
supermajorities to override it45 would mean that the FDA could
still regulate this speech. Once again, as in the gag rule situation,
thanks to delegation, the hurdles that were built into the legislative
process to protect liberty ironically end up obstructing its protec-
tion.
A third example of delegated lawmaking that undermined
liberty involved the 1975 sanction by the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") of Pacifica Radio for broadcasting George
Carlin's famous "Seven Dirty Words" monologue. 6 The FCC
based its decision on statutory language prohibiting the broadcast
of "obscene, indecent, or profane language."47 The Supreme Court
ultimately upheld the FCC on the ground that the broadcast, while
not obscene, was indecent under the statute." But the term inde-
cent is so open-ended as to confer on the FCC virtually unlimited
lawmaking authority. 9 Indeed, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit had reversed the FCC's
opinion on the ground that it was rulemaking in disguise and that
the resulting rule was overbroad °.5  The upshot of this delegation
was that the FCC got to be both lawmaker and law enforcer over
the content of constitutionally protected speech to boot.
The Supreme Court has seen fit to tolerate most delegation.
44 See Charles J. Lewis, Teen Smoking Pits FDA Against Tobacco Firms, TIMES UNION
(Albany), Jan. 21, 1996, at Al (stating that President would veto any bill that exempted
tobacco from the realm of the FDA's regulation).
45 See Charles J. Lewis, Tobacco Companies Plead Case with $4.3M, TIMES UNION
(Albany), Mar. 15, 1996, at Al (quoting Matthew Myers, an anti-smoking activist, as stat-
ing that "[Congress] certainly [does not] have the votes to override a presidential veto").
46 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
47 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994).
48 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 741.
49 The lower court that struck down the Communications Decency Act ("CDA"),
which criminalized, inter alia, "indecent" expression on the Internet, based its holding in
part on the fact that the undue vagueness of that term violated the Fifth Amendment's
due process guarantee. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 856 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(Sloviter, J., plurality opinion); id. at 858 (Buckwalter, J., plurality opinion). While the
Supreme Court did not reach the Fifth Amendment vagueness claim, affirming instead the
lower court's ruling on a First Amendment overbreadth rationale, the Court's discussion
of the First Amendment issues revealed substantial concerns about the vagueness of the
CDA's operative terms, including "indecent." See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2344
(1997) ("Regardless of whether the CDA is so vague that it violates the Fifth Amendment,
the many ambiguities concerning the scope of its coverage render it problematic for pur-
poses of the First Amendment.").




Whether or not this tolerance is justified,5' Congress has an inde-
pendent duty to protect liberty by exercising its responsibility to
make the law.
51 I am not endorsing Congressman J.D. Hayworth's bill, The Congressional Respon-
sibility Act of 1997, H.R. 1036, 105th Cong. (1997), or any other specific legislation on the
delegation issue at this point. The ACLU is nervous about jeopardizing particular regula-
tions that affirmatively promote liberty. Given a Congress that is hostile to many civil lib-
erties, these regulations are an especially important tool for us now. But, as I have also
noted, in some political contexts, regulations can subvert liberty, even when Congress
seeks to protect it. Therefore, I applaud and thank Professors Hamilton and Schoenbrod
for organizing this important symposium, which focuses attention on Congress's constitu-
tional duty to protect liberty by exercising its responsibility to make law through the speci-
fied Article I process. I look forward to further discussions about how best to implement
that important duty.
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